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1. Introduction 
	
In the following analysis we deal with only specific corruption cases within our seven-country sample 
for content analysis (France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and the UK). Only 5,212 
relevant articles dealt with such cases within the total sample (12,742). We focus here on providing a 
descriptive comparative analysis of the actors, types of transactions and country specifics. The second 
part of the analysis describes the actors involved in the corrupt transactions, while in the third section 
we deal with the object of exchange in corrupt transactions. The fourth section focuses on the type of 
transaction which is linked to the corruption. Finally, a summary of the results of our preliminary 
findings is provided. 
	
2. Representation of specific corruption cases 
 
The following section discusses the variables related to the representation of specific corruption cases 
in the seven examined countries. A corruption case occurs between one or more agents and clients. 
Such a transaction can be characterized by the nature of agents, the clients, the exchanged goods, 
and/or also whether the transaction was repeated or was a one-off event. An article was categorized as a 
representation of a specific corruption case when it specified the actors who had engaged in a named 
act of corruption. 
Figure 1 contains the main topic of the articles by country in the case that the article did not treat 
corruption as a marginal topic. The number of articles by country is included in parenthesis. As can be 
seen, there were huge differences between the total numbers of articles. The lower the number of 
examined articles (for example, in the case of Romania), the lower the level of validity. As a result 
some caution is necessary in understanding the comparative analysis. Amongst the examined countries, 
articles published in Romania (87,1%) and Hungary (84,5%) were most likely to mention specific 
corruption cases when they mentioned one of the corruption keywords. In almost every examined 
country the proportion of specific corruption cases from the total was higher than 70 percent. Articles 
from the UK and from France dealt more with corruption as a general phenomenon (17,7% and 17,3%) 
because of their international focus. A quarter of the Latvian articles reported on anticorruption 
activities carried out by authorities. The next section only includes an analysis of those articles in 
which a specific corruption case was mentioned.  
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Figure 1: Main topic of articles by country (%) 
 
 
 
3. Actors involved in corruption cases 
 
The following section only discusses actors involved in specific corruption cases. The actors typically 
involved in a specific corruption case are the agent and the client. An agent is someone who works for 
a public institution and provides an advantage to a client of the organization.  
 
Figure 2: Agent/Client focus by country (%) 
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Figure 2 demonstrates whether the examined articles focused on the client or on the agent. In most 
cases (more than 66 percent), news outlets focused on the agent – this is probably the result of agents 
typically being politicians and thus being interesting subjects to write about. Meanwhile, any mention 
of clients was relegated to the background. French news outlets had an agent focus 73,6 percent of the 
time, and Hungarian news outlets 76,1 percent. The greatest focus on clients was found in British 
(23,7%), Latvian (20,5%) and French (17,4) news outlets. The client appeared to be least significant to 
Slovakian (6,4%), Hungarian (7,3%) and Italian (9,2%) news outlets. Slovakia represented both clients 
and agents most equally (21,5%).  
 
3.1 Type of actors in articles by country 
	
Figure 3: Type of agent involved in corruption cases by country (%) 
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focused on domestic and local ones. The number of group actors (31,3% agents and 19,4% clients) is 
significant in the case of Italy. In comparison with other European countries, Italy’s criminal organi-
zations are often more institutionalized and are thus embedded in certain economic sectors, societal 
groups and territorial areas (Sberna et al., 2015). In Romania, both agents (55,6%) and clients (39,5%) 
were dominantly single actors. Institutions as clients appeared in significant proportions in the case of 
the UK (16,9%), France (16,2%) and Slovakia (18,9%).  
 
Figure 4: Type of client involved in corruption cases by country (%) 
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there are a significant number of group agents (33%) and group clients (14,8%). Groups of agents are 
also present at an international level (32%). The reason single agents are more likely to be named at a 
local level might be that news outlets politically instrumentalize corruption cases that involve oppo-
sition politicians.  
 
Figure 5: Type of agents involved in corruption cases by main event area (%) 
 
 
Figure 6: Type of clients involved in corruption cases by main event area (%) 
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Figure 6, in comparison with Figure 5, demonstrates that agents were much more likely to be men-
tioned in the articles than clients. In 10-20 percent of all cases the type of agent, and in around fifty 
percent the type of clients were not identified. Reporting on corruption usually involves a focus on the 
agent because agents are more likely to be connected to public institutions, while in many cases it is 
hard to identify who the client is. In this case, it seems that the analyzed news outlets are putting even 
more emphasis on agents. This may firstly be that the audience is more interested in the activities of 
politicians than businessmen. Such types of articles have a much greater effect on politics and 
politicians than businessmen. Moral outrage may be created when corruption concerns politicians 
because they are supposed to represent the public good and public interests.   
	
3.3 Type of actors in articles by corruption type 
 
Figure 7: Type of agents involved in corruption cases by main type of corruption (%) 
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actors. In the case of solicitation, single agents (66,9%) and single clients (40,4%) were more prevalent 
than in the case of bribery. In our sample, embezzlement is defined as a transaction in which agents are 
even more indispensable: more than ninety percent of the agents were identified in such cases, and only 
fifteen percent of clients. 
 
Figure 8: Type of clients involved in corruption cases by main type of corruption (%)
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countries agents are more likely to be government and state representatives (in around sixty percent of 
cases). The amount of sports-related actor agents is highest in the UK (13%) and Slovakia (10,3%).  
Table 1: Position of agent by country (%) 
 Italy  UK France Slovakia  Hungary Latvia  Romania 
Government or state high 
representative 16,9 22,0 27,6 22,9 33,0 15,7 18,8 
Public official, manager, 
consultant 13,3 7,9 7,7 13,8 10,8 18,6 12,6 
Politician 8,8 4,4 12,1 9,6 2,8 11,0 1,8 
Mayor, local administrator 22,7 1,1 3,9 9,5 12,0 20,8 7,2 
Businessman 7,8 12,7 15,0 5,3 11,4 3,0 2,2 
Judge, Prosecutor, Inspector, 
Detective 2,0 0,9 2,7 6,7 2,0 3,5 4,9 
Policeman 4,9 6,2 4,1 3,8 3,2 4,6 5,8 
Medical doctor, nurse 3,9 1,3 0,7 3,4 0,7 0,6 1,8 
Sport actor 1,8 13,0 3,6 10,3 1,5 0,3 4,9 
Other 11,2 9,4 8,5 5,9 10,8 4,8 8,1 
Not applicable 6,5 21,0 14 8,8 11,8 17,1 31,8 
Total 100,0 (1369) 
100,0 
(746) 
100,0 
(413) 
100,0 
(624) 
100,0 
(1207) 
100,0 
(630) 
100,0 
(223) 
 
Table 2: Position of agent according to country (aggregated categories) (%) 
 Italy  UK  France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania 
Government or state 
representative 62,5 35,7 51,3 55,9 59,3 66,2 40,8 
Public official, manager, 
consultant 7,8 12,7 15,0 5,3 11,4 3,0 2,2 
Judge, Prosecutor, 
Inspector, Detective 2,0 0,9 2,7 6,7 2,0 3,5 4,9 
Policeman 4,9 6,2 4,1 3,8 3,2 4,6 5,8 
Medical doctor, nurse 3,9 1,3 0,7 3,4 0,7 0,6 1,8 
Sport actor 1,8 13 3,6 10,3 1,5 0,3 4,9 
Other 10,5 9,1 8,5 5,8 10,0 4,6 7,6 
Not applicable 6,5 21,0 14,0 8,8 11,8 17,1 31,8 
Total 100 (1369) 
100 
(746) 
100 
(413) 
100 
(624) 
100 
(1207) 
100 
(630) 
100 
(223) 
 
As demonstrated before, clients remain in the background and in most cases remain unknown or 
unmentioned (Table 3). But the focus is not only on the agents; in most cases news outlets do not even 
identify who clients are. One possible explanation for this is the earlier mentioned reason that news 
outlets tend to name agents because they are most likely to be politicians. The other potential 
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explanation is the lack of journalistic investigation by news outlets. While agents are typically well 
known personalities, the identity of clients is harder to discover. In our sample grand corruption is 
overrepresented. Only ten percent of petty corruption was committed by businessmen and almost forty 
percent by citizens. In a typical (grand) corruption case, for example, bribery (the most frequent type of 
corruption represented in our sample) businessman are the initiators of the corruption transactions, 
bribing government or state representatives. Bribery cases typically happen when the public sector and 
business sector meet.  
Businessmen are the most well represented clients, especially in Italy (28,7%) and Slovakia (28,2%). In 
France, government representatives as clients are mentioned in significant numbers (9,9%). 
 
Table 3: Position of client according to country (aggregated categories)	(%) 
 Italy  UK  France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania 
Government or state 
representative 6,7 5,5 9,9 2,1 4,1 1,4 4,9 
Businessman 28,7 23,6 14,3 28,2 18,1 20,2 23,3 
Citizen 5,3 2,8 1,0 1,9 3,9 1,6 3,6 
Other 13,7 16,5 8,7 18,9 8,6 17,5 12,6 
Not applicable 45,6 51,6 66,1 48,9 65,3 59,4 55,6 
Total 100 (1369) 
100 
(746) 
100 
(413) 
100 
(624) 
100 
(1207) 
100 
(630) 
100 
(223) 
 
 
4. Object of exchange 
	
4.1 Object of exchange by country 
In response to the questions: “What does the agent give to the client?”, and “What kind of goods does 
the embezzler appropriate?” the model indicates that news outlets from most of the countries reported 
that non-material goods were given by the agent to the client (see Figure 9). The agent usually provides 
clients with positions, licenses, and so on, but a significant amount of material goods are also provided. 
In the case of Hungary, agents provided more material goods (41,8%) than non-material ones. On the 
other hand, Slovakia and Latvia media reported that an extremely low amount of material goods were 
transferred by agents (5,1% and 5,6%). 
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Figure 9: ‘What does the agent give to the client?’ Object of exchange by country (%) 
 
 
Figure 10: ‘What does the client give to the agent?’ Object of exchange by country (%) 
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4.2 Object of exchange by type of transaction 
 
Figure 11: ‘What does the agent give to the client?’ Object of exchange by corruption type (%) 
 
 
Figure 12: ‘What does the client give to the agent?’ Object of exchange by corruption type (%) 
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Typical transactions that require material goods from the client (see Figure 12) are bribery (58,4%), 
extortion (41,3%) and illegal party financing (53,5%).  
 
4.3 Type of original transaction by country 
	
Figure 13: Type of transaction affected by corruption by country (%) 
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national and local cases. Considering the amount of one-off transactions, the two new European Union 
member countries’ papers reported many more of them: 35,7% of the Slovakian, 30,1% of the 
Hungarian, 24,9% of the Latvian and 31,4% of the Romanian-specific cases were one-off transactions, 
while this proportion is only 6,3% in the UK, 12,1% in France and 16,5% in Italy. This distinction 
might be due to the amount of international cases that are reported on by old European Union members 
that tend to be repeated transactions. When a corruption case gets international attention, then it has 
probably been going on for a while. Our hypotheses concerning the representation of one-off transac-
tions is that new EU members report more one-off transactions at the local and national level. Taking a 
look at the amount of one-off transactions versus repeated transactions (Figure 14) we gain a more 
sophisticated picture. In France and Italy there are more one-off transactions reported in the media 
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(44,3% and 44,1%), which may indicate institutionalized and widespread corruption. However, new 
EU members still have a higher amount of one-off transactions represented in their media.  
 
Figure 14: Type of transaction affected by corruption by country (national and local level) (%) 
 
 
One possible explanation for this is that in old EU members’ news outlets there is a stronger tradition 
of journalism and harsher competition between media products. While new EU members’ media outlets 
still consider a one-off transaction to be important news, media reports in France Italy and the UK 
focus more on “huge” and “important” cases that generate higher attention and make media products 
more marketable. 
 
4.4 Type of original transaction by main event arena 
As illustrated in Figure 15, specific corruption cases were more likely to be presented as “repeated” at 
the international level (41,2%), probably because of the more general description of corruption. When 
the event arena was international or a foreign country, the amount of one-off transactions was very low 
(11,8% and 16,7%). On the local level, the tendency is the reverse. The amount of reported one off 
transactions is the highest (26%), while the amount of repeated transactions is 33%. Another 
observable tendency is that the more the event arena is local, the more the amount of non-applicable 
cases decreases (47% at an international level and 41% on a local level).  
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Figure 15: Type of transaction affected by corruption by main event arena (%) 
 
 
4.5 Type of original transaction by corruption type 
	
Figure 16: Type of transaction affected by corruption by main type of corruption (%) 
 
 
Figure 16 demonstrates the type of original transaction by type of corruption. As a general remark, the 
more specific a type of corruption is, the less frequently the original transaction can be categorised as 
non-applicable. For example, in the case of embezzlement, the original type of transaction was not 
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were most likely to be repeated transactions. In the case of collusion, the type of transaction was not 
applicable in 51% of cases and the lowest amount of one-off transactions were recorded (12,3%), next 
to fraud with 10,8% percent. Most of the types of corruption were reported as one-off events (more 
than twenty percent of cases).  
 
5. Type of interactions 
	
At the following section describes, a CHAID (Chi Square Automatic Interaction Detection) classifica-
tion method was applied to the specific cases. The model examined the specific interactions between 
the agent and the client by country. The outcome (dependent) variable in the analysis was the examined 
countries. The independent variables were initially all the variables that affect and characterize the 
transactions between an agent and a client, and the context, but the analysis proved only four of them to 
significantly affect the outcome country.  
The CHAID analysis is a classification tree method that calculates how variables best combine to 
explain the outcome defined by the dependent variable. CHAID is based on chi square calculations and 
is appropriate for classifying categorized variables (rather than continuous variables). The method 
executes several steps in defining the outcome categories. In the first step, the whole sample is divided 
into subsamples based on the less independent variable after its statistically independent categories 
have been merged. In the following steps, this algorithm is repeated for the previously separated 
subsets (IBM, 2012).  
After identifying the significant variables for the analysis, in order to simplify the process we recoded 
those variables so as to reduce the number of values.  
• One important variable was the event arena, or where the corruption case happened. We 
recoded the variable to have two values: international/foreign or national/local event arena.	
• The second important variable was the type of agent. After recoding, the agent was determined 
to be one of two variables: single agent or non-single agent (the latter category contains both 
group actors and institutional actors).	
• The third variable considered was the type of transaction: this could be either one-off or 
repeated.	
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• The fourth variable was the position of the agent: this we recoded into government or state 
representative, or other type of agent2. 	
Using the aforementioned independent variables and the countries as a dependent variable, the CHAID 
method created 15 outcome categories. Table 4 illustrates the steps by which the algorithm separated 
the sample in order to generate the outcome categories, and indicates the defining characteristics of the 
outcome category, as well as the percentages of observed cases. For example, for the first outcome 
category (10.2%) the method first considered only local and national level cases (the variability of the 
other independent variables was lowest after this separation), then the cases in which the type of actor 
was unknown, and then the cases which only happened once (one-off transactions). The number of 
such cases is 532. Accordingly, each outcome category represents one type of interaction. 
 
Table 4: Type of interaction for each outcome category and most and least characteristic 
countries in each outcome category 
# Variables which determine the outcome category in order of application % 
1. Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by single actor, one-off transaction. 10.2 
2. Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by single actor, repeated transaction. 8.5 
3. Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by single actor, type of transaction unidentifiable. 15.8 
4. Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by non-single actor, one-off transaction. 5.4 
5. Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by non-single actor, repeated transaction. 10.8 
6. Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by non-single actor, type of transaction unidentifiable. 8.3 
7. Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by not identified actor, one-off transaction. 7.2 
8. Event arena is local/national or missing, committed by unidentified actor, repeated transaction. 1.5 
9. Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction is one-off, committed by government or state representative as agent. 3.3 
10. Event arena is international/foreign, transaction is one-off, committed by non-governmental agent. 1.7 
11. Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction is repeated, committed by government or state representative as agent. 5.8 
12. Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction is repeated, agent was non-governmental representative or missing. 6.2 
13. Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction unidentifiable, committed by government or state representative as agent. 7.8 
14. Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction unidentifiable, committed by non-government or state representative as agent. 4.7 
15. Event arena is international/foreign, type of transaction unidentifiable, position of agent was missing. 2.8 
 Total percentage 100.0 
 Total number of analysed articles 5,212 
																																								 																				
2 Categories that were aggregated as government or state representatives: Government or state high representative, Public 
official, manager, consultant, Politician and Mayor, local administrator. The second category contains everything that is not 
included by these positions (businessmen, citizens, sports-related actors, etc.). 
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Table 5 illustrates the 15 outcome categories by country. For example, in the first outcome category 
158 cases (29,7%) are Italian. So the most characteristic outcome country for the first outcome 
category is Italy, but the outcome category also includes Hungarian cases (n=123, 23,1%). 
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able 5: O
utcom
e categories by country 
O
utcom
e 
category # 
Italy 
U
K
 
France 
Slovakia 
H
ungary 
L
atvia 
R
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ania 
T
otal 
 
N
o. 
%
 
N
o. 
%
 
N
o. 
%
 
N
o. 
%
 
N
o. 
%
 
N
o. 
%
 
N
o. 
%
 
N
o. 
%
 
1 
158 
29.7 
16 
3.0 
12 
2.3 
96 
18.0 
123 
23.1 
79 
14.8 
48 
9.0 
532 
100.0 
2 
189 
42.8 
26 
5.9 
16 
3.6 
43 
9.7 
102 
23.1 
39 
8.8 
27 
6.1 
442 
100.0 
3 
401 
48.8 
29 
3.5 
40 
4.9 
94 
11.4 
77 
9.4 
143 
17.4 
38 
4.6 
822 
100.0 
4 
38 
13.6 
5 
1.8 
4 
1.4 
58 
20.7 
134 
47.9 
38 
13.6 
3 
1.1 
280 
100.0 
5 
159 
28.2 
38 
6.7 
10 
1.8 
33 
5.9 
263 
46.6 
56 
9.9 
5 
0.9 
564 
100.0 
6 
207 
47.7 
15 
3.5 
16 
3.7 
48 
11.1 
91 
21.0 
50 
11.5 
7 
1.6 
434 
100.0 
7 
68 
18.2 
32 
8.6 
12 
3.2 
43 
11.5 
58 
15.5 
101 
27.0 
60 
16.0 
374 
100.0 
8 
14 
17.5 
21 
26.3 
2 
2.5 
1 
1.3 
27 
33.8 
9 
11.3 
6 
7.5 
80 
100.0 
9 
12 
6.9 
8 
4.6 
22 
12.6 
35 
20.1 
72 
41.4 
17 
9.8 
8 
4.6 
174 
100.0 
10 
8 
9.3 
17 
19.8 
11 
12.8 
23 
26.7 
24 
27.9 
2 
2.3 
1 
1.2 
86 
100.0 
11 
19 
6.3 
117 
38.9 
37 
12.3 
19 
6.3 
86 
28.6 
22 
7.3 
1 
0.3 
301 
100.0 
12 
10 
3.1 
144 
44.7 
67 
20.8 
26 
8.1 
64 
19.9 
10 
3.1 
1 
0.3 
322 
100.0 
13 
56 
13.7 
109 
26.7 
94 
23.0 
61 
15.0 
45 
11.0 
40 
9.8 
3 
0.7 
408 
100.0 
14 
24 
9.8 
97 
39.4 
49 
19.9 
38 
15.4 
24 
9.8 
11 
4.5 
3 
1.2 
246 
100.0 
15 
6 
4.1 
72 
49.7 
21 
14.5 
6 
4.1 
17 
11.7 
13 
9.0 
10 
6.9 
145 
100.0 
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Table 6 describes the most and the least representative countries within the outcome categories. 
 
Table 6: Type of interaction in the case of each outcome category and most and least 
characteristic countries  
#	 Most characteristic countries	 Least characteristic countries	
1.	 Italy / Hungary	 France / UK	
2.	 Italy / Hungary	 France / UK	
3.	 Italy / Latvia	 UK / Romania	
4.	 Hungary / Slovakia	 Romania / France	
5.	 Hungary / Italy	 Romania / France	
6.	 Italy / Hungary	 Romania / France	
7.	 Latvia / Italy	 France / UK	
8.	 Hungary / UK	 France / Romania	
9.	 Hungary / Slovakia	 UK / Romania	
10.	 Hungary / Slovakia	 Romania / Latvia	
11.	 UK / Hungary	 Romania Italy / Slovakia	
12.	 UK / France	 Romania Latvia / Italy	
13.	 UK / France	 Romania / Latvia	
14.	 UK / France	 Romania / Latvia	
15.	 UK / France	 Slovakia / Italy	
 
As can be seen, Italy is the most characteristic country in the case that the event arena is local or 
national, and the case is committed by single actors, no matter if the transaction is one-off, repeated or 
unidentifiable. Italy is also characteristic in the case that the event arena is local/national or missing, the 
case is committed by a non-single actor, and where the type of transaction is unidentifiable. Moreover, 
Italian news outlets are not likely to include foreign and international cases that involved repeated 
transactions, or cases where both the transaction and type of agent was missing. 
Hungary is the country most characteristic in the case of five outcome categories, including when the 
event arena is local or national and the case is committed by non-single (group or institution) or 
unidentifiable actors, regardless of whether the transaction is repeated or not. Hungary is the most 
characteristic country in the case of the international or foreign event arena when the type of transac-
tion is one-off, regardless of whether the agent is a governmental representative or non-governmental 
actor. Slovakia also matches this second pattern, being the second most characteristic country in these 
outcome categories.  
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Slovakia is the least characteristic country in the case of foreign and international cases that have 
repeated transactions, and cases where both the transaction and type of agent were missing. 
Latvia is the most characteristic country in one outcome category where the event arena is 
local/national or missing, the case was committed by an unidentified actor, and it involved a one-off 
transaction.  
Latvia is the least characteristic country when the event area is international or foreign and the case was 
committed by a non-governmental actor as agent. It is also the least characteristic country in the case of 
the foreign or international event area when the type of transaction was unidentifiable. 
UK is the most representative country in five of the outcome categories. These outcome categories 
include cases when the event arena is international or foreign and the type of transaction was either 
repeated or not possible to identify, regardless of whether the agent was a governmental or non-
governmental actor. France is the second most characteristic country in four of these five outcome 
categories, with very similar corruption transactions.  
UK is the least characteristic country when the event area is local or national, and the act was 
committed by single actor, regardless of the transaction type. UK also is the least characteristic country 
when the event arena was international/foreign, where the type of transaction was one-off and the case 
was committed by the government or a state representative as the agent, or the agent is missing.  
France is among the least characteristic countries in almost every case when the event area is local or 
national. Due to its low number of cases, Romania remains an insignificant country in this regard in 
almost all of the outcome categories. 
Table 7 demonstrates how the country-specific cases are divided between the outcome categories. 
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1 
158 
11.54 
16 
2.14 
12 
2.14 
96 
15.38 
123 
10.19 
79 
12.54 
48 
21.72 
2 
189 
13.81 
26 
3.49 
16 
3.49 
43 
6.89 
102 
8.45 
39 
6.19 
27 
12.22 
3 
401 
29.29 
29 
3.89 
40 
3.89 
94 
15.06 
77 
6.38 
143 
22.70 
38 
17.19 
4 
38 
2.78 
5 
0.67 
4 
0.67 
58 
9.29 
134 
11.10 
38 
6.03 
3 
1.36 
5 
159 
11.61 
38 
5.09 
10 
5.09 
33 
5.29 
263 
21.79 
56 
8.89 
5 
2.26 
6 
207 
15.12 
15 
2.01 
16 
2.01 
48 
7.69 
91 
7.54 
50 
7.94 
7 
3.17 
7 
68 
4.97 
32 
4.29 
12 
4.29 
43 
6.89 
58 
4.81 
101 
16.03 
60 
27.15 
8 
14 
1.02 
21 
2.82 
2 
2.82 
1 
0.16 
27 
2.24 
9 
1.43 
6 
2.71 
9 
12 
0.88 
8 
1.07 
22 
1.07 
35 
5.61 
72 
5.97 
17 
2.70 
8 
3.62 
10 
8 
0.58 
17 
2.28 
11 
2.28 
23 
3.69 
24 
1.99 
2 
0.32 
1 
0.45 
11 
19 
1.39 
117 
15.68 
37 
15.68 
19 
3.04 
86 
7.13 
22 
3.49 
1 
0.45 
12 
10 
0.73 
144 
19.30 
67 
19.30 
26 
4.17 
64 
5.30 
10 
1.59 
1 
0.45 
13 
56 
4.09 
109 
14.61 
94 
14.61 
61 
9.78 
45 
3.73 
40 
6.35 
3 
1.36 
14 
24 
1.75 
97 
13.00 
49 
13.00 
38 
6.09 
24 
1.99 
11 
1.75 
3 
1.36 
15 
6 
0.44 
72 
9.65 
21 
9.65 
6 
0.96 
17 
1.41 
13 
2.06 
10 
4.52 
Total 
1369 
100 
746 
100 
413 
100 
624 
100 
1207 
100 
630 
100 
221 
100 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Our database shows considerable differences between the analysed countries in terms of the corruption 
cases. There are differences in the representation of the type and position of actors, the exchanged 
objects, as well as the type of transactions. General conclusions can also be made about the 
representation of corruption cases by the analysed news outlets. 
Concerning the representation of the agent and the client in the articles, the main emphasis on 
corruption as a transaction is usually on the agent because the agent is more likely to be associated with 
a public institution, while in many cases it is hard to know who the client is. Also, agents are more 
likely to be politicians who should have a higher level of social responsibility, so articles about them 
may have greater social impact. Clients, who are more likely to be businessmen involved in grand 
corruption, remain in the background because they are less interesting to the audience, or because of a 
lack of journalistic investigation.  
Single actor agents are more likely to be named at the local level. This might be because news outlets 
politically instrumentalize corruption cases involving opposition politicians. However, it may be that 
audiences are less interested in reporting about international politicians.  
Local-level action in specific corruption cases is significant in the case of Latvia and Italy. In Italy, 
actors involved in corruption are often groups. This may be because in Italy corruption is traditionally 
more institutionalized, involving groups and institutions (Sberna et al., 2015).  
Not every similarity in the type of actors involved in the corruption cases entailed similar situations. 
The articles published in the UK described similar types of agents involved in corruption to, for 
example, their Hungarian counterparts: about forty percent of single and thirty percent of group actors. 
British news outlets mostly described international corruption cases. In many aspects they are similar to 
French news outlets. 
The closer the event arena is to the local level, the fewer the not applicable cases, and the more one-off 
corruption transactions were reported. The more international a transaction was, the more repeated 
transactions were reported by the news outlets. The explanation for this could be that, on the 
international level, corruption is represented as a more general phenomenon. At the same time, when a 
case receives international attention it was supposedly already ongoing for a while. One-off trans-
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actions were more likely to be represented on the local level, but this style of representation did not 
emerge uniformly in every country. Distinction could be made by new and old EU member countries.  
The media of new EU members report more one-off transaction at a local and national level, while old 
EU members report about repeated transactions more. In old EU member states’ news outlets there is a 
stronger tradition of journalism and stronger competition between media products. While new EU 
members’ media outlets still consider one-off transactions to be important news, France’s Italy’s and 
the UK’s media report more on “huge” or “important” cases that make their media products more 
marketable. 
Finally, we defined interaction types in our corruption cases to see what kind of interactions were 
characteristic for each country. From the CHAID analysis the following conclusions were arrived at: 
Italy was the most characteristic country in the case when the event arena was local or national, and the 
case was committed by single actors or non-single actors, no matter whether the transaction was one-
off, repeated or not possible to identify. Hungary was most characteristic when the event arena was 
local or national and the case was committed by non-single (group or institution) or unidentified actors, 
regardless of whether the transaction was repeated or not. Hungary was the most characteristic country 
in the case of the international or foreign event arena when the type of transaction was one-off, 
regardless of whether the agent was a governmental representative or non-governmental actor. Slovakia 
was similar to Hungary in this sense, being the second most characteristic country in these outcome 
categories.  
Latvia was the most characteristic country in one outcome category: when the event arena was 
local/national or missing, the case was committed by an unidentified actor, and in the case of one-off 
transactions. UK was the most representative country in all the foreign/international case-dominated 
outcome categories, while French media had a very similar position to the British.  
  
	 26	
References 
	
IBM Corporation (2012). IBM SPSS Decision Trees 21. Available at: 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/its/pdfs/SPSS_Decision_Trees_21.pdf (acc. 26/04/16). 
S. Sberna, A. Vannucci, Z. Szántó, I. J. Tóth, B. Pápay, T. Bezlov, et al. (2015), Integrated Report: 
European University Institute.  
  
	 27	
Appendix: 
 
Table 1:Main topic of articles by country 
 Italy UK France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania Total 
A case (or some 
cases) of 
corruption 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
77.3% 72.5% 74.4% 72.3% 84.5% 54.9% 87.1% 73.9% 
Corruption as a 
general 
phenomenon 
192 182 96 103 136 204 29 942 
10.8% 17.7% 17.3% 11.9% 9.5% 17.8% 11.3% 13.4% 
Anticorruption, 
regulation law 
or 
anticorruption 
national 
authorities’ 
activities 
201 68 29 96 52 286 3 735 
11.3% 6.6% 5.2% 11.1% 3.6% 24.9% 1.2% 10.4% 
Anticorruption 
activities by 
citizens, 
NGO.... 
10 33 17 40 34 28 1 163 
0.6% 3.2% 3.1% 4.6% 2.4% 2.4% 0.4% 2.3% 
Total 
1772 1029 555 863 1429 1148 256 7052 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 2: Agent or client focus 
 Italy UK  France  Slovakia  Hungary Latvia Romania Total 
Agent 
910 421 304 396 918 398 108 3455 
66.5% 56.4% 73.6% 63.5% 76.1% 63.2% 48.4% 66.3% 
Client 
126 177 72 40 88 129 35 667 
9.2% 23.7% 17.4% 6.4% 7.3% 20.5% 15.7% 12.8% 
Both 
204 43 19 134 96 46 21 563 
14.9% 5.8% 4.6% 21.5% 8.0% 7.3% 9.4% 10.8% 
Not 
applicable/Not 
possible to 
determine 
129 105 18 54 105 57 59 527 
9.4% 14.1% 4.4% 8.7% 8.7% 9.0% 26.5% 10.1% 
Total 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 3: Type of agent by country 
 Italy UK France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania Total 
A single actor or several 
actors acting independently 
815 312 252 348 460 319 124 2630 
59.5% 41.8% 61.0% 55.8% 38.1% 50.6% 55.6% 50.5% 
A group or network of actors 
429 199 52 145 452 92 9 1378 
31.3% 26.7% 12.6% 23.2% 37.4% 14.6% 4.0% 26.4% 
An institution, company, 
association, political party 
35 74 54 59 166 87 9 484 
2.6% 9.9% 13.1% 9.5% 13.8% 13.8% 4.0% 9.3% 
Not applicable/Not possible 
to determine 
90 161 55 72 129 132 81 720 
6.6% 21.6% 13.3% 11.5% 10.7% 21.0% 36.3% 13.8% 
Total 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 4: Type of client by country 
 Italy UK France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania Total 
A single actor or several 
actors acting independently 
382 162 59 169 192 117 88 1169 
27.9% 21.7% 14.3% 27.1% 15.9% 18.6% 39.5% 22.4% 
A group or network of actors 
266 78 15 48 118 66 8 599 
19.4% 10.5% 3.6% 7.7% 9.8% 10.5% 3.6% 11.5% 
An institution, company, 
association, political party 
94 126 67 118 119 60 10 594 
6.9% 16.9% 16.2% 18.9% 9.9% 9.5% 4.5% 11.4% 
Not applicable/Not possible 
to determine 
627 380 272 289 778 387 117 2850 
45.8% 50.9% 65.9% 46.3% 64.5% 61.4% 52.5% 54.7% 
Total 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 5: Type of agent in the articles by main event area 
  International 
Foreign 
country National Local Total 
A single actor or several actors acting 
independently 
154 680 996 795 2625 
35,5% 54,5% 49,8% 52,2% 50,4% 
A group or network of actors 
139 290 446 502 1377 
32,0% 23,2% 22,3% 33,0% 26,5% 
An institution, company, association, political 
party 
54 101 237 92 484 
12,4% 8,1% 11,9% 6,0% 9,3% 
Not applicable/Not possible to determine 
87 177 320 134 718 
20,0% 14,2% 16,0% 8,8% 13,8% 
Total 
434 1248 1999 1523 5204 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 6: Type of client in the articles by main event area 
 Italy UK France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania Total 
A single actor or several actors acting 
independently 
382 162 59 169 192 117 88 1169 
27,9% 21,7% 14,3% 27,1% 15,9% 18,6% 39,5% 22,4% 
A group or network of actors 
266 78 15 48 118 66 8 599 
19,4% 10,5% 3,6% 7,7% 9,8% 10,5% 3,6% 11,5% 
An institution, company, association, 
political party 
94 126 67 118 119 60 10 594 
6,9% 16,9% 16,2% 18,9% 9,9% 9,5% 4,5% 11,4% 
Not applicable/Not possible to 
determine 
627 380 272 289 778 387 117 2850 
45,8% 50,9% 65,9% 46,3% 64,5% 61,4% 52,5% 54,7% 
Total 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 7: Position of agent by country 
 Italy UK France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania Total 
Government or state high 
representative 
232 164 114 143 398 99 42 1192 
16,9% 22,0% 27,6% 22,9% 33,0% 15,7% 18,8% 22,9% 
Public official, manager, 
consultant 
182 59 32 86 130 117 28 634 
13,3% 7,9% 7,7% 13,8% 10,8% 18,6% 12,6% 12,2% 
Politician 
121 33 50 60 34 69 4 371 
8,8% 4,4% 12,1% 9,6% 2,8% 11,0% 1,8% 7,1% 
Mayor, local administrators 
311 8 16 59 145 131 16 686 
22,7% 1,1% 3,9% 9,5% 12,0% 20,8% 7,2% 13,2% 
Businessman 
107 95 62 33 137 19 5 458 
7,8% 12,7% 15,0% 5,3% 11,4% 3,0% 2,2% 8,8% 
Judge, Prosecutor, Inspector, 
Detective 
28 7 11 42 24 22 11 145 
2,0% 0,9% 2,7% 6,7% 2,0% 3,5% 4,9% 2,8% 
Policeman 
67 46 17 24 39 29 13 235 
4,9% 6,2% 4,1% 3,8% 3,2% 4,6% 5,8% 4,5% 
Medical doctor, nurse 
54 10 3 21 9 4 4 105 
3,9% 1,3% 0,7% 3,4% 0,7% 0,6% 1,8% 2,0% 
Sports-related actor 
25 97 15 64 18 2 11 232 
1,8% 13,0% 3,6% 10,3% 1,5% 0,3% 4,9% 4,5% 
Other 
153 70 35 37 130 30 18 473 
11,2% 9,4% 8,5% 5,9% 10,8% 4,8% 8,1% 9,1% 
Not applicable 
89 157 58 55 143 108 71 681 
6,5% 21,0% 14,0% 8,8% 11,8% 17,1% 31,8% 13,1% 
Total 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 8: Position of agent by country (aggregated) 
 Italy UK France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania Total 
Government 
or state high 
representative 
855 266 212 349 716 417 91 2906 
62,5% 35,7% 51,3% 55,9% 59,3% 66,2% 40,8% 55,8% 
Businessman 
107 95 62 33 137 19 5 458 
7,8% 12,7% 15,0% 5,3% 11,4% 3,0% 2,2% 8,8% 
Judge, 
Prosecutor, 
Inspector, 
Detective 
28 7 11 42 24 22 11 145 
2,0% 0,9% 2,7% 6,7% 2,0% 3,5% 4,9% 2,8% 
Policeman 
67 46 17 24 39 29 13 235 
4,9% 6,2% 4,1% 3,8% 3,2% 4,6% 5,8% 4,5% 
Medical 
doctor, nurse 
54 10 3 21 9 4 4 105 
3,9% 1,3% 0,7% 3,4% 0,7% 0,6% 1,8% 2,0% 
Sports-related 
actor 
25 97 15 64 18 2 11 232 
1,8% 13,0% 3,6% 10,3% 1,5% 0,3% 4,9% 4,5% 
Other 
144 68 35 36 121 29 17 450 
10,5% 9,1% 8,5% 5,8% 10,0% 4,6% 7,6% 8,6% 
Not applicable 
89 157 58 55 143 108 71 681 
6,5% 21,0% 14,0% 8,8% 11,8% 17,1% 31,8% 13,1% 
Total 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
	
	 	
	 32	
Table 9: Position of client by country (aggregated) 
 
Italy UK France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania Total 
Government or 
state high 
representative 
92 41 41 13 49 9 11 256 
6,7% 5,5% 9,9% 2,1% 4,1% 1,4% 4,9% 4,9% 
Businessman 
393 176 59 176 219 127 52 1202 
28,7% 23,6% 14,3% 28,2% 18,1% 20,2% 23,3% 23,1% 
Citizen 
73 21 4 12 47 10 8 175 
5,3% 2,8% 1,0% 1,9% 3,9% 1,6% 3,6% 3,4% 
Other 
187 123 36 118 104 110 28 706 
13,7% 16,5% 8,7% 18,9% 8,6% 17,5% 12,6% 13,5% 
Not applicable 
624 385 273 305 788 374 124 2873 
45,6% 51,6% 66,1% 48,9% 65,3% 59,4% 55,6% 55,1% 
Total 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
	
Table 10: ‘What does the agent give to the client?’ Object of exchange by country 
 Italy UK France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania Total 
Purely material goods 
244 115 95 32 504 35 53 1078 
17,8% 15,4% 23,0% 5,1% 41,8% 5,6% 23,8% 20,7% 
Non-material goods 
484 257 115 341 323 233 61 1814 
35,4% 34,5% 27,8% 54,6% 26,8% 37,0% 27,4% 34,8% 
Not applicable/Not 
possible to determine 
641 374 203 251 380 362 109 2320 
46,8% 50,1% 49,2% 40,2% 31,5% 57,5% 48,9% 44,5% 
Total 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 11: ‘What does the client give to the agent?’ Object of exchange by country 
 Italy UK France Slovakia Hungary Latvia Romania Total 
Purely material goods 
480 315 153 349 233 238 83 1851 
35,1% 42,2% 37,0% 55,9% 19,3% 37,8% 37,2% 35,5% 
Non-material goods 
171 42 52 6 39 28 16 354 
12,5% 5,6% 12,6% 1,0% 3,2% 4,4% 7,2% 6,8% 
Not applicable/Not possible to 
determine 
718 389 208 269 935 364 124 3007 
52,4% 52,1% 50,4% 43,1% 77,5% 57,8% 55,6% 57,7% 
Total 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
	
Table 12: Type of original transaction by country 
 Italy UK France 
Slovaki
a 
Hungar
y Latvia 
Roman
ia Total 
One-off transaction 
226 47 50 223 363 157 70 1136 
16,5% 6,3% 12,1% 35,7% 30,1% 24,9% 31,4% 21,8% 
Repeated transactions 
391 346 132 122 542 136 40 1709 
28,6% 46,4% 32,0% 19,6% 44,9% 21,6% 17,9% 32,8% 
Not applicable/Not possible to 
determine 
752 353 231 279 302 337 113 2367 
54,9% 47,3% 55,9% 44,7% 25,0% 53,5% 50,7% 45,4% 
Total 
1369 746 413 624 1207 630 223 5212 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 13: Type of original transaction by main event arena 
 International 
Foreign 
country National Local Total 
One-off transaction 
51 209 477 396 1133 
11,8% 16,7% 23,9% 26,0% 21,8% 
Repeated transactions 
179 444 584 502 1709 
41,2% 35,6% 29,2% 33,0% 32,8% 
Not applicable/Not possible to determine 
204 595 938 625 2362 
47,0% 47,7% 46,9% 41,0% 45,4% 
Total 
434 1248 1999 1523 5204 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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T
able 14: T
ype of agent by corruption type 
 
B
ribery, 
kickback 
E
m
bezzlem
ent 
Illegal 
party 
financing 
Solicitation, 
extortion 
A
buse of 
pow
er/office 
C
ollusion, 
cartel 
C
lientelism
, 
nepotism
, 
fam
ilism
 
Fraud 
O
ther 
T
otal 
A
 single actor 
or several 
actors acting 
independently 
1224 
411 
49 
222 
154 
28 
187 
119 
236 
2630 
52,4%
 
44,7%
 
48,5%
 
66,9%
 
58,1%
 
18,1%
 
51,5%
 
47,6%
 
47,9%
 
50,5%
 
A
 group or 
netw
ork of 
actors 
638 
341 
11 
96 
68 
26 
65 
84 
49 
1378 
27,3%
 
37,1%
 
10,9%
 
28,9%
 
25,7%
 
16,8%
 
17,9%
 
33,6%
 
9,9%
 
26,4%
 
A
n institution, 
com
pany, 
association, 
political party 
140 
110 
34 
6 
22 
21 
58 
31 
62 
484 
6,0%
 
12,0%
 
33,7%
 
1,8%
 
8,3%
 
13,5%
 
16,0%
 
12,4%
 
12,6%
 
9,3%
 
N
ot 
applicable/N
ot 
possible to 
determ
ine 
332 
57 
7 
8 
21 
80 
53 
16 
146 
720 
14,2%
 
6,2%
 
6,9%
 
2,4%
 
7,9%
 
51,6%
 
14,6%
 
6,4%
 
29,6%
 
13,8%
 
Total 
2334 
919 
101 
332 
265 
155 
363 
250 
493 
5212 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
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T
able 15: T
ype of clients by corruption type 
  
B
ribery, 
kickback 
E
m
bezzlem
ent 
Illegal 
party 
financing 
Solicitation, 
extortion 
A
buse of 
pow
er/office 
C
ollusion, 
cartel 
C
lientelism
, 
nepotism
, 
fam
ilism
 
Fraud 
C
orruption 
in general 
O
ther 
T
otal 
A
 single actor 
or several 
actors acting 
independently 
703 
56 
26 
134 
41 
25 
102 
22 
21 
39 
1169 
30,1%
 
6,1%
 
25,7%
 
40,4%
 
15,5%
 
16,1%
 
28,1%
 
8,8%
 
8,9%
 
15,2%
 
22,4%
 
A
 group or 
netw
ork of 
actors 
360 
27 
20 
61 
17 
28 
48 
23 
8 
7 
599 
15,4%
 
2,9%
 
19,8%
 
18,4%
 
6,4%
 
18,1%
 
13,2%
 
9,2%
 
3,4%
 
2,7%
 
11,5%
 
A
n institution, 
com
pany, 
association, 
political party 
316 
55 
10 
25 
19 
52 
52 
18 
14 
33 
594 
13,5%
 
6,0%
 
9,9%
 
7,5%
 
7,2%
 
33,5%
 
14,3%
 
7,2%
 
5,9%
 
12,8%
 
11,4%
 
N
ot 
applicable/N
ot 
possible to 
determ
ine 
955 
781 
45 
112 
188 
50 
161 
187 
193 
178 
2850 
40,9%
 
85,0%
 
44,6%
 
33,7%
 
70,9%
 
32,3%
 
44,4%
 
74,8%
 
81,8%
 
69,3%
 
54,7%
 
Total 
2334 
919 
101 
332 
265 
155 
363 
250 
236 
257 
5212 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
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T
able 16: ‘W
hat does the agent give to the client?’ O
bject of exchange by corruption type	
 
B
ribery, 
kickback 
E
m
bezzlem
ent 
Illegal 
party 
financing 
Solicitation, 
extortion 
A
buse of 
pow
er/office 
C
ollusion, 
cartel 
C
lientelism
, 
nepotism
, 
fam
ilism
 
Fraud 
C
orruption 
in general 
O
ther 
T
otal 
Purely 
m
aterial 
goods 
      292 
523 
21 
44 
42 
13 
39 
66 
5 
33 
1078 
12,5%
 
56,9%
 
20,8%
 
13,3%
 
15,8%
 
8,4%
 
10,7%
 
26,4%
 
2,1%
 
12,8%
 
20,7%
 
N
on-m
aterial 
goods 
1106 
68 
29 
166 
98 
37 
190 
48 
32 
40 
1814 
47,4%
 
7,4%
 
28,7%
 
50,0%
 
37,0%
 
23,9%
 
52,3%
 
19,2%
 
13,6%
 
15,6%
 
34,8%
 
N
ot 
applicable/N
ot 
possible to 
determ
ine 
936 
328 
51 
122 
125 
105 
134 
136 
199 
184 
2320 
40,1%
 
35,7%
 
50,5%
 
36,7%
 
47,2%
 
67,7%
 
36,9%
 
54,4%
 
84,3%
 
71,6%
 
44,5%
 
Total 
2334 
919 
101 
332 
265 
155 
363 
250 
236 
257 
5212 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
	
T
able 17: W
hat does the client give to the agent?’ O
bject of exchange by corruption type 
 
B
ribery, 
kickback 
E
m
bezzlem
ent 
Illegal 
party 
financing 
Solicitation, 
extortion 
A
buse of 
pow
er/office 
C
ollusion, 
cartel 
C
lientelism
, 
nepotism
, 
fam
ilism
 
Fraud 
C
orruption 
in general 
O
ther 
T
otal 
Purely 
m
aterial goods 
1364 
85 
54 
137 
33 
25 
56 
53 
21 
23 
1851 
58,4%
 
9,2%
 
53,5%
 
41,3%
 
12,5%
 
16,1%
 
15,4%
 
21,2%
 
8,9%
 
8,9%
 
35,5%
 
N
on-m
aterial 
goods 
161 
18 
16 
66 
19 
10 
38 
5 
7 
14 
354 
6,9%
 
2,0%
 
15,8%
 
19,9%
 
7,2%
 
6,5%
 
10,5%
 
2,0%
 
3,0%
 
5,4%
 
6,8%
 
N
ot 
applicable/N
ot 
possible to 
determ
ine 
809 
816 
31 
129 
213 
120 
269 
192 
208 
220 
3007 
34,7%
 
88,8%
 
30,7%
 
38,9%
 
80,4%
 
77,4%
 
74,1%
 
76,8%
 
88,1%
 
85,6%
 
57,7%
 
Total 
2334 
919 
101 
332 
265 
155 
363 
250 
236 
257 
5212 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
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T
able 18: T
ype of original transaction by corruption 
 
B
ribery, 
kickback 
E
m
bezzlem
ent 
Illegal 
party 
financing 
Solicitation, 
extortion 
A
buse of 
pow
er/office 
C
ollusion, 
cartel 
C
lientelism
, 
nepotism
, 
fam
ilism
 
Fraud 
C
orruption 
in general 
O
ther 
T
otal 
O
ne-off 
transaction 
554 
202 
28 
88 
70 
19 
83 
27 
22 
43 
1136 
23,7%
 
22,0%
 
27,7%
 
26,5%
 
26,4%
 
12,3%
 
22,9%
 
10,8%
 
9,3%
 
16,7%
 
21,8%
 
R
epeated 
transactions 
720 
414 
41 
93 
78 
57 
128 
110 
22 
46 
1709 
30,8%
 
45,0%
 
40,6%
 
28,0%
 
29,4%
 
36,8%
 
35,3%
 
44,0%
 
9,3%
 
17,9%
 
32,8%
 
N
ot 
applicable/N
ot 
possible to 
determ
ine 
1060 
303 
32 
151 
117 
79 
152 
113 
192 
168 
2367 
45,4%
 
33,0%
 
31,7%
 
45,5%
 
44,2%
 
51,0%
 
41,9%
 
45,2%
 
81,4%
 
65,4%
 
45,4%
 
Total 
2334 
919 
101 
332 
265 
155 
363 
250 
236 
257 
5212 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
 
100%
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